

Message Text

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60

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 EB-11 TRSE-00

SCEM-02 STR-08 CEA-02 CIEP-02 OMB-01 COME-00 INT-08

SCI-06 SIL-01 LAB-06 DRC-01 (ISO) W

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R 111051Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7513

INFO USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

T/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 270

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T OSLO 4534

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PINT ENRG NATO NO IS

SUBJECT: CALL ON NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER

1. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI WAS CORDIAL AND NOTICEABLY

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MORE RELAXED WHEN HE RECEIVED ME ON DECEMBER 7 FOR OVER AN HOUR.

HE SUMMARIZED NORWAY'S POSITION ON GREECE AT THE FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL (OSLO 4516), EXPRESSED HIS CONTINUED PERSONAL SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL, ALLUDED TO THE PERSONAL AS WELL AS OTHER REASONS WHY HE OPPOSES ANY SIGNIFICANT ACCELERATION IN NORWAY'S "GO SLOW" OIL EXTRACTION POLICY, FORECAST THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF EUROPE, INCLUDING SCANDINAVIA, IN THE NEXT 10-20 YEARS, EXPRESSED GUARDED SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. ATLANTIC POLICY AND INDICATED HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE U.S. POSITION ON BURDENSARING AS OUTLINED TO THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS. IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT POSED TO HIS RULE BY THE LEFT SOCIALIST ELECTORAL LEAGUE (SV), HE SPOKE AS THE "OLD PRO," CONDESCENDING TOWARDS THE LEFT'S INEPT TACTICS AND CONFIDENT HE COULD HANDLE THEM. END SUMMARY.

2. MIDDLE EAST. BRATTELI SAID THAT HE SAW NO PURPOSE IN GETTING INVOLVED AS A SMALL POWER IN THIS QUESTION SINCE NORWAY HAD NO REAL ROLE TO PLAY (ADVICE, HOWEVER, WHICH NORWAY CONSPICUOUSLY IGNORES ON SOME OTHER ISSUES). HE REITERATED HIS PERSONAL STRONG PRO-ISRAELI SENTIMENTS AND COMMENTED ON HIS FRANK DIALOGUE WITH GOLDA MEIR AND THE PRESENT ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO NORWAY, ITZHAK KEENAN (IN SHARP CONTRAST, BRATTELI NOTED, TO KEENAN'S PREDECESSOR). HE SAID HE HAS TOLD THE ISRAELIS BLUNTLY THAT THEIR GREAT MISTAKE AFTER 1967 WAS TO BECOME OVER-CONFIDENT AND DEVELOP A "WEAPON MENTALITY," DISREGARDING THE NEED TO NEGOTIATE. THIS ATTITUDE COULD ULTIMATELY LEAD TO DISASTER, BUT THE RECENT FIGHTING WAS A SOBERING EXPERIENCE FOR ISRAEL. BRATTELI SAID THAT SINCE THE U.S. AND USSR ARE INVOLVED, THEY HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT.

3. ENERGY CRISIS. ASKED WHETHER THE OIL EMBARGO AND ENERGY CRISIS WERE LIKELY TO PERSUADE NORWAY TO RE-THINK ITS "MAKE HASTE SLOWLY" POLICY ON OFF-SHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT, BRATTELI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE FOREIGN PRESSURES IN THIS DIRECTION BUT ALSO STRONG COUNTERVAILING CONSIDERATIONS. SPEAKING FROM PERSONAL RECOLLECTION OF THE DISASTER WHICH BEFELL NORWEGIAN WHALE OIL INDUSTRIES AND THE LITTLE PEOPLE DEPENDENT UPON THEM IN THE AREA WHERE HE GREW UP, WHEN EXCESSIVE EXPLOITATION LED TO NEAR EXTINCTION OF THE WHALES, BRATTELI EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL OPPOISTION TO ANY SUCH

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"SHORT-TERM ADVENTURES" WITH OIL. HE ALSO REFERRED WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, TO THE OTHER MORE USUAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF CAUTION (ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE, DISRUPTION OF EXISTING INDUSTRY, ETC).

4. COMMON MARKET. ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ABOUT THE EEC, BRATTELI ARGUED THAT THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE IS INEVITABLE AND ALL OF EUROPE WILL, IN FACT,

BE INTEGRATED OVER THE NEXT 10-20 YEARS. HE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED SCANDINAVIA IN EUROPE BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER HE ALSO EMBRACED EASTERN EUROPE IN HIS PREDICTION. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT NATIONALIST DIFFERENCES WOULD CONTINUE TO BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICALLY COHESIVE EUROPE.

5. ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. BRATTELI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EEC AND NATO REGARDING DECLARATIONS OF TRANS-ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY WAS, "LET'S HURRY UP AND SIGN." THE DRAGGED OUT DISCUSSION AND TALK OF DIVISIONS IN NATO CAN ONLY MAKE A COUNTRY LIKE NORWAY UNEASY. HE SAID THAT, "AS FAR AS I UNDERSTAND" THE POSITIONS OF THE DIFFERENT NEGOTIATORS, NORWAY HAD VERY MUCH THE SAME POSITION AS THE U.S. ON THIS GENERAL QUESTION.

6. BURDENSARING. BRATTELI RESPONDED TO MY REMARKS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMONSTRATING SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS IN THIS AREA BY AGREEING FULLY THAT THIS IS NECESSARY. WHILE HE DID NOT COMMENT ON THE ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURES WHICH I CITED, HE MADE A NOTE TO HIMSELF TO LOOK INTO AMBASSADOR RUMSFIELD'S STATEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN LEFT WITH THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS.

7. LEFTIST DOMESTIC PRESSURE. DROPPING HIS USUAL MODEST AIR, BRATTELI LABELED HIMSELF A "TRULY EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONAL PARLIAMENTARIAN," AND AS SUCH, SAID HE HAD COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO HANDLE THE SV. HE SAID THAT THE LEFTISTS HAD ALREADY MADE SOME BAD TACTICAL MISTAKES AND BEHAVED IN A "FOOLISH FASHION," AND THUS FAILED TO RALLY VOTER SUPPORT, CITING IN PARTICULAR THEIR DECISION TO PRESS FOR A 25 PERCENT CUT IN DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OF THE MOMS (VALUE-ADDED TAX) ON FOOD. THEY COULD HAVE GENERATED MUCH MORE SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRY IF THEY HAD NOT TAKEN

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PATENTLY UNREALISTIC EXTREME POSITIONS. ON THE TAX QUESTION, LABOR PARTY IS UNITED IN ITS VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE SV. THE PRESSURE RATHER IS ON THE SV, WHICH IS BEGINNING TO SHOW SPLITS IN ITS RANKS OVER TACTICS. BRATTELI FELT THAT THE NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES WOULD HAVE TROUBLE OPPOSING HIS TAX PROGRAM SINCE TO DO SO,

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